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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

25 July 1980

MEMORANDUM

Cuba-Nicaragua: Support for Central American Insurgencies



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


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[REDACTED] allude to a continuing low-level Nicaraguan involvement with the revolutionary left in El Salvador, but they also emphasize the Sandinista leaders' concern to maintain a deniable cover for their direct support. [REDACTED]



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[REDACTED]

Plans for a "final offensive" are also said to be going ahead under the aegis of the newly formed revolutionary directorate, which theoretically is responsible for both political and military decisions. The timing of the guerrillas' next push apparently depends largely on the receipt of sufficient arms.

[REDACTED] The general impression, however, is that arms supplies are short and that deliveries--from whatever source--have been at least temporarily disrupted by recent events. Nevertheless, the revolutionaries are looking forward to the arrival of more in the not-too-distant future. [REDACTED]

Meanwhile, [REDACTED] concerning an extreme leftist group in El Salvador calling itself the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC). The organization is not particularly well known to us, but a PRTC group in Guatemala was reportedly responsible for the recent kidnaping of a US citizen there and is said to be planning other similar acts. [REDACTED] claims that a Soviet adviser is responsible for coordinating the group's arms shipments, which are said to be in short supply at the moment, although more are expected shortly. Reflecting the alleged international character of the organization, its military operations are said to be controlled by a nine-man directorate that includes members from Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador together with Nicaraguan FSLN leaders Bayardo Arce and Hugo Torres. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] concerning Nicaraguan involvement [REDACTED] claim to have received training from the FSLN or to have been accompanied by Sandinista advisers. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The general concern of the Sandinista leadership, in fact, seems to be to avoid even the appearance of open involvement as much as possible. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in early June the National Directorate of the FSLN [REDACTED]

decided to establish training camps for the Salvadoran revolutionaries in northern Costa Rica--the implication being that they no longer wished to carry on this sort of activity on Nicaraguan territory. They apparently were not deterred by the publicity surrounding the crash of an arms-laden aircraft in El Salvador on 15 June (see below), but did decide to shift the location away from Costa Rica's Guanacaste Province in favor of the east coast near Puerto Limon. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
the FSLN leaders were still willing to allow Nicaragua to be used as a transit point for personnel and equipment for El Salvador. This information is at variance with an earlier report [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the FSLN had decided in early 1980 to set up a clandestine support apparatus in Costa Rica to avoid the use of Nicaraguan territory [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] underscore the apparent concern of the Sandinista leaders to avoid any appearance or accusation of direct involvement while still continuing to offer at least some support to Salvadoran leftists. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Pages: 5,6

Exemptions: (b)(1)(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

Nicaragua: In addition to the discussions with the Hondur-
ans, the Cubans apparently have been in contact with Salvadoran
and possibly other Central American leftists through their embassy
in Managua, which also apparently furnishes transit and even
temporary housing facilities.

[REDACTED]

Pages: 8

Exemptions: (b)(1), (b)(3)